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Utilizing Tort Law to Deter Misconduct in the
Public Sector
Boaz Segal
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes tort law’s ability to effectively guide the actions of
public officials and agencies and proposes separating tort judgments into
two components: the imposition of accountability and the imposition of
liability. This separation leads, in turn, to the conclusion that it is sufficient
to impose accountability—and to label the public official and agency
negligent—in order to effectively guide their conduct. An important
perspective is thereby added to the discourse on the deterrent power of tort
law. To date, tort law discourse has been largely dominated by the paradigm
of the economic analysis of law, thereby focusing on the financial sanction
component and ignoring to some extent the imposition of accountability.
According to the theory of public choice, public officials do not always act
optimally to maximize the public interest. That is why the need arises to guide
their conduct. This article opens by analyzing the fundamental difficulties in
the approach that views tort law as an effective deterrent tool in the public
sector. These difficulties mainly refer to the fact that public-sector tortfeasors
do not personally bear the compensation costs, and consequently, respond
less to market incentives and more to political ones. Therefore, tort law is
inappropriate in a field where the players belong to the public sector and it
will have a hard time deterring them and effectively guiding their conduct.



Doctor of Law, School of Law, Sapir Academic College and School of Law, Zefat
Academic College. I would like to thank Prof. Barak Medina of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and Israel Supreme Court Justice Prof. Ofer Grosskopf for their important,
enlightening comments on previous drafts of the article.
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While accepting this criticism of the deterrent approach and adopting the
assumption that public officials, in contrast to private agents, are unlikely to
be responsive to the risk of the imposition of financial compensation, this
article demonstrates that, from the deterrence perspective, tort law can still
be used for the purpose of guiding the conduct of public officials. The reason
for this is the heavy price that the imposition of accountability by a court of
law is likely to exact from the public official as a social actor. Phrased
differently, being liable is insufficient to guide the conduct of public officials
when the deterrent power ascribed to tort law only relates to the imposition
of liability. However, when the deterrent power of tort law is examined with
respect to the imposition of accountability, a different conclusion may be
reached.
This conclusion—that the rules of accountability effectively guide the
conduct of public officials—derives from recognition that public officials
attribute great importance to their public reputations and, consequently, are
likely to be deterred by the thought of being under court investigation (even
if the financial compensation is not directly incurred by them). Furthermore,
this conclusion derives from recognition that public agencies function as
social actors, to which “external attribution” and “intentionality” can be
ascribed. These two characteristics make them susceptible to the external
approval of the public and guides their conduct accordingly. In this manner,
the threat of being labeled negligent deters public agencies and their desire
to avoid such labeling guides their conduct, leading them to internalize the
public price of their negligent conduct. Moreover, the desire of public
agencies to avoid negative labeling and their capacity to intentionally act
optimally remedy the failures of the public official seeking to act otherwise.
Therefore, the imposition of tortious accountability on public officials is an
important tool, the goal being to guide their conduct and create effective
deterrence.
This article concludes that it is the Damoclean sword of tort
accountability—rather than tort liability—that keeps public agencies and
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their employees on their toes, incentivizing them to act optimally to maximize
the public interest.

I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that, in order to answer the question of how to hold
public actors (officials and agencies) accountable for their actions, a
distinction must be drawn between two separate components that act in
conjunction in tort rulings. In the first stage, tort law functions as
accountability law, and focuses on the defendant, the tortfeasor; in the
second, it functions as compensation law, where the compensation is paid
to the injured party, the plaintiff. The professional literature largely fails to
distinguish sufficiently between these two components, although each is
deserving of a separate analysis.
Availing oneself of the rich literature in the field of organizational
research, this article proposes viewing the public agency as a “social actor”
and demonstrates that two important characteristics can be ascribed to it—
external attribution and intentionality. The characteristic of external
attribution means the agency attributes the utmost importance to the matter
of its external reflection and its public image; the characteristic of
intentionality assumes the agency can be ascribed with intentions and
aspirations with respect to its political survival and bureaucratic autonomy,
along with the ability to act accordingly.1 A potential tort judgment
determining that an agency failed in fulfilling its role serves as a tool for
guiding its conduct and is capable of causing it to act optimally due to its
sensitivity to its public image (external attribution) and to its aspirations,
which are directed towards political survival and bureaucratic autonomy
(intentionality). In this context, this article maintains that the agency’s
1
Brayden G. King, Teppo Felin & David A. Whetten, Perspective—Finding the
Organization in
Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as a Social Actor, 21 ORG.
SCI. 290, 293 (2010).
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intentionality directly leads to the correction of the public official’s acts.
Consequently, this article concludes that the Damoclean sword of tort
accountability—to be distinguished from that of tort liability—keeps
agencies and their employees on their toes, constituting an important
incentive for them to act optimally to maximize the public interest. An
important angle is thereby added to the discourse on the deterrent power of
tort law over public agencies and their employees. To date, tort law discourse
has been largely dominated by the paradigm of the economic analysis of the
law, focusing on the component of financial sanctions and, in so doing, has
neglected the imposition of accountability.2
Accordingly, the sections of this article—and the overall argument—will
unfold as follows: Section B presents the deterrence theory, which asserts
that tort law can be used to guide the conduct of public agencies by means of
a cost-internalization mechanism, using the tool of financial compensation.
This section also examines the criticism of the deterrent power of tort law,
according to which the imposition of compensation on public agencies in
order to guide their conduct is ineffective due to the absence of a correlation
between the agent committing the tort and the agent internalizing the cost.
Next, Section C argues that deterrence considerations justify the utilization
of tort law to guide the conduct of public officials, in spite of acceptance of
the criticism against this proposition. It does so by stressing the impact of an
additional component of tort law besides that of compensation, the
component of accountability. Section D winds down the Article with an
overall summary.

2

For example, sources on the discourse focusing on the compensation mechanism, see
infra note 8.
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II. CRITICISM LEVELED AGAINST TORT LAW AS NOT DETERRING
MISCONDUCT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A. Presentation of the Deterrence Theory
The theory of public choice3 proposes the assumption that public officials
act to further some private, not (or not exclusively) public, interest when
making decisions.4 Once it is understood that government decisions are not
always optimal for the public good and do not necessarily further public
interests, it can be argued that the losses resulting from these decisions should
be imposed on the government. However, from the deterrence perspective,
this argument only holds if it can be assumed the State will indeed change its
conduct due to the State having to bear these losses. The assumption that the
imposition of tort liability will influence the potential tortfeasors’ conduct is
problematic when it is a question of a public agency as opposed to a privatelyowned company. In spite of these difficulties, the law aspires to prevent the
State from violating rights by coercing it, when acting tortiously, to take into
consideration the costs liable to be incurred by so doing.5
3
To review the chronicling of the theory of public choice, see ROBERT D. TOLLISON,
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE – II, 3–7 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds.,
1984).
4
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19 (Daniel A. Farber &
Anne J. O’Connell eds., 2010); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 10–11 (1997).
5
In this immediate context, the cost-effectiveness approach to public sector tortfeasors
stresses the importance of adopting policies designed to maximize the value of social
resources, as reflected in the preferences of all the members of a specific society. Thus, the
guiding principle remains the maximization of social welfare. See LOUIS KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006); Louis Kaplow, Transition
Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (2003). The
question of when government policies are optimal is beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it for me to briefly note that, according to the Kaldor-Hicks approach, optimization
is achieved when, due to a specific step adopted by a public agency, the situation of a given
society improves, and those benefitting from the change are in a position to compensate
the losers, who may then be indifferent to it, while the winners remain winners even after
covering the outlay. It should be stressed that, according to this theory, compensation is
not paid to actual losers. Rather, the extent of the benefit for the winners is compared with
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Thus, the remedies of public law, whose purpose is to prevent public actors
from violating constitutional rights, aspire to coerce the State to take into
account the potential costs of its problematic acts. 6 In the United States, for
example, public agencies are required to compensate those who are injured
by the violation of their constitutional rights. An example of this in the U.S.
is the prohibition against expropriating privately owned property for public
use without appropriate compensation.7 Certain scholars view the deterrence
theory model as the most direct ascription of market behavior to public
actors. Thus, in their view, the compensation liable to be imposed for
expropriation (and for constitutional torts in general) is designed to guide the
actions of public actors. This argument is based on the perception that state
conduct is rational and profit-based, and the potential obligation to pay
compensation prevents it from misusing its power, constraining it to attach
considerable weight to the interest of the property owner who would be
harmed by the expropriation.
The concept of optimality underlying the obligation to pay compensation
is accepted by many scholars as a powerful explanation for State behavior. 8
that of the loss for the losers, and if the former exceeds the latter, the change of policy is
deemed optimal. It might be advisable to demand that governments actually compensate
the losers—an approach closer to Pareto optimality, which requires that a step only be
taken by a public agency if it benefits at least one individual without worsening the
situation of any other individual. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITIONS 13–14 (reprt. ed. 2014).
6
See Richard H. Jr. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as
Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988).
7
In the U.S., practically no provisions are in place authorizing public agencies to
expropriate land without compensation, at either the state or federal level. Such a provision
would represent a taking without compensation. It would be contrary to the Constitution
and, as a result, would be null and void. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8
For Posner, coercing the State to pay compensation “prevents the government from
overusing the taking power.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (9th
ed. 2014). Posner is a prominent supporter of the idea of compensation in connection with
state activity and recommends its implementation in diverse contexts. See Richard A.
Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49 (1981); Richard A.
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These scholars believe the State is willing to internalize such social costs
when these costs translate into budgetary losses, the State in this context
being perceived as acting similarly to a private actor in a market environment.
This compensation mechanism creates a mirror image of similar cases where
the tortfeasors are private actors. Just as the law coerces private actor
tortfeasors to internalize costs, it forces the State to do so, which
consequently is compelled to take overall social costs into account when
adopting one decision or the other. In short, there is a resemblance between
private actors and the State with regard to both purpose and means. The
purpose is deterrence, the mechanisms—internalization of costs by means of
the financial compensation tool.
B. Problems of the Deterrence Theory
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the criticism appearing in the
professional literature of tort law’s ability to guide the actions of public
officials. From the deterrence perspective, the application of tort law to the
public sector is reasonable if one assumes governments respond to the
incentives created by the provisions for compensation in tort law in the same
way as private actors do. In contrast, the rule of “absence of accountability”
is likely to turn out to be preferable if governments are assumed to be
nonresponsive to these incentives. Thus, the deterrence argument can be
countered by maintaining that public officials do not respond to costs and

Posner, Excessive Sanctions of Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH.
L. REV. 635 (1982); see also Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier,
Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999);
Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation
Be Paid? 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749 (1994); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 580 (1984);
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid? 99 Q.J. Econ. 71, 71–92 (1984); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC USE (2011).
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profits in the same way as privately owned companies do. Consequently, the
State and its agencies cannot be compared with privately owned companies.
It is customary to refer to privately owned companies as rational actors
aspiring to maximize profits and minimize costs. From an economic
perspective, one would expect individuals—not companies—to act that way
in order to realize private interests. Rationality is ascribable to private
companies when they are owned by investors, and it is the latter who aspire
to maximize their personal profits by maximizing company profits. In
contrast, the State acts in an entirely different manner because public actors
respond less to market incentives and more to political ones.9 When it is a
question of public officials, three reasons can be enumerated to explain why
deterrence is ineffective, the common denominator being the absence of a
correlation between the agent committing the tort and the agent paying the
compensation money. The first reason is the negation of the personal
accountability of the public official and its replacement by the institutional
accountability of the public agency. The second reason is the source of
payment of the financial compensation. This compensation is derived from
the taxes of the public as a whole. The third reason is that the tortfeasor does
not bear the legal defense costs.
The first reason that deterrence is ineffective relates to the distinction
between the personal accountability of the employee and the institutional
accountability of the public agency. It can be argued that compensation
claims do not constitute an effective deterrence tool for public officials
because they do not personally incur the payment. When tortious liability is
not personal, its deterrence effectiveness, as well as the concern about overdeterrence, is questionable. In the U.S., the law confers absolute immunity
on federal employees for common law torts. American law provides for the
9

“Because government actors respond to political, not market, incentives, we should not
assume that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to make a
budgetary outlay.” Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 348 (2000).
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substitution by the government of employees against whom a tort claim has
been filed. This is not limited exclusively to employees officiating in
government positions or situations where the public official was in contempt
or intentionally committed a tort.10 That being the case, the question arises
whether tort law is capable of guiding the conduct of public officials when
their personal accountability shelters under the institutional accountability of
the agency.
The second reason relates to the fact that when accountability is imposed
on the State, it is the tax-paying public that compensates the injured party. If
the State were to respond to tort rules in the same manner as privately owned
companies, it could be argued that these rules have the power to guide
conduct. However, if the State merely deflects the losses caused by it to the
public, then these laws are incapable of exacting from it a cost that will serve
as a deterrent against suboptimal conduct.11 Put simply, the government
deflects costs imposed on it by courts to the community (subject to costs
related to lost voters) and, consequently, tort rules do not effectively guide
its conduct. Accordingly, tort law in this category transfers capital from one
group to another. This, of course, can be supported by considerations such as
distributive justice and dispersion of damage. However, the deterrence
purpose, in itself, is harmed.
Thus far, we have analyzed the split between the agent committing the tort
and the agent paying the compensation. For the third reason, an additional
type of cost—borne by tortfeasors in the private sector—not specifically
deducted from the public sector tortfeasor’s budget is legal defense costs.
Public agencies often maintain their own legal advisors, whose role is similar
to that of attorneys employed by privately owned companies. At the same
time, a large percentage of court cases involving federal public officials are
10

Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §
2679.
11
See David S. Cohen, Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment of the State, 40 U.
TORONTO L.J. 213, 253–54 (1990).
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handled by attorneys from the Department of Justice, which funds them. In
this manner, other departmental budgets are not affected by the costs of these
services. This mechanism, whereby the public sector tortfeasor’s legal
defense costs are passed on to the Department of Justice, creates a very
different reality than that faced by privately owned companies, which bear
these costs directly.
C. Summary
In this section, this article presented the deterrence theory argument that
tort law can be utilized to guide the conduct of public agencies, using the
cost-internalization mechanism by means of the financial compensation tool
to create a deterrent. Next, it presented theoretical criticism of the deterrent
capacity of tort law, according to which the imposition of compensation on
public agencies in order to guide their conduct is ineffective, due to the
absence of a correlation between the agent committing the tort and the agent
paying the compensation.
Public officials have two important characteristics: one, they respond less
to market incentives, and more to political ones; two, they are protected by
the absence of a correlation between the agent committing the tort and the
agent paying the compensation. Thus, the criticism voiced in the professional
literature, that the power of tort law to guide conduct in the public sector is
damaged and questionable, comes as no surprise. This raises concern that
public officials will continue to function sub-optimally, even if the law at
times allows private injured parties to file tort claims against agencies.12 In
the discussion below, it will be made clear that this conclusion is not
inevitable, as public sector tortfeasors suffer extensive damage when labeled
negligent.

12

On the problems deriving from a similar attitude towards costs and profits in the world
of markets and politics, see Levinson, supra note 9, at 416–17.
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III. UTILIZING TORT LAW TO ACHIEVE OPTIMAL CONDUCT
This section deals with the way tort law effectively guides governmental
conduct. It comes as a response to the critical positions on the utilization of
tort law to guide the conduct of potential tortfeasors in the public sector
discussed in Section B above. This article now establishes the advantages of
tort law for guiding conduct in the public sector, arguing that holding public
officials accountable for their negligent conduct is vital in order to set
government discretion on the right path so it is exercised for the
maximization of public interest. Tort claims are an effective means of
signaling suboptimal government activity, and tort claims guide the conduct
of public officials and agencies, incentivizing them to function appropriately.
To ground this argument, this section distinguishes between two reference
levels that both, simultaneously, establish the underlying value of tort law:
the public official as a private personality (whose deterrence will is
referred to as “private guidance”) and public agencies as social actors
(whose deterrence is referred to as “central guidance”). This distinction is
important because the argument in this context is that the ability of tort law
to guide the actions of agencies, by means of their characteristics as social
actors, is also of great significance in situations where public officials cannot
be effectively deterred. This is because the desire of agencies to avoid
negative labeling and their ability to intentionally act optimally (the solution)
may remedy the failures of public officials aspiring to act sub-optimally (the
problem).
A. Level of the Public Official as a Private Personality: Private Guidance
The argument about the suboptimality of government activity is essentially
based on the failures and biases in the motives and actions of public officials.
Government suboptimality does not derive solely from failures in the actions
of the agencies themselves but rather, and perhaps mainly, from the modus
operandi of their officials. This article argues that it is best to use tort law to
achieve private guidance—that is, to guide the activity of public officials. On
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its face, because public officials are not liable to be personally sued for
compensation and will at least not pay the cost out of their own pocket, tort
law would appear to have no influence on their correcting their failures.
These assertions do not account for the effect of the very prospect of a tort
proceeding—focusing on the public official— which suffices to deter them,
thereby creating private guidance. The main reason for this deterrence is
public officials’ concern about damage to their reputation, which often is
their most prized asset. A damaged reputation is enough to impact their social
standing and future occupation.
Public officials do not derive much comfort from the agency bearing the
burden of paying the compensation adjudged against them, and the
imposition of tortious accountability on the agency—due to the actions or
shortcomings of their employees—also has the power to guide the conduct
of the latter.13 The main reason for this accountability is that public approval
is a basic interest of public officials. It is vital for their public existence and
for the furthering of their status. Such approval is one of their most prized
resources—indeed, their legitimation to hold public office derives from it.
Therefore, tort proceedings are capable of deterring public officials when
they know they are liable to be the focus, in the course of which the court
will disclose their negligent conduct to the public.
Naturally, it is desirable that public approval of public officials is in line
with their qualifications and deeds. The public cannot be expected to hold its
agents and representatives in higher social and professional regard than is due
to them.14 A tort court’s labeling of a public official as negligent helps the
public to adjust its level of approval of them accordingly. Thus, this labeling
furthers the public interest, according to which there should be a correlation
13
But see Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 560–
61 (1985) (explaining tort law is incapable of guiding the conduct of potential tortfeasors
in the public sector, who would prefer to avoid the negative publicity generated by the
imposition of tortious accountability on them).
14
For related literature, see R.F.V. HEUSTON & RICHARD A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND AND
HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 157 (21st ed., 1996).
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between actual and desirable approval. Thus, the public has a high stake in
the disclosure of the professional and social approval due to public officials,
and it is here that the tort court enters the picture, labeling them, if that is the
case.
It follows that in order to properly appreciate the power of the tool of
tortious labeling, one must first understand that the extent of the damage
caused by labeling a person negligent is especially great when the latter is a
public sector tortfeasor. Public officials are better known than private
individuals and are held in high regard by a wider public. It is this public that
is liable to exact political costs if it becomes apparent that public officials
were negligent and aspired to maximize a private, rather than a public,
interest. Consequently, a drop in the approvals has considerably wider and
deeper repercussions for public officials. Their discrediting and labeling as
negligent is liable to harm their post, their profession, and their occupation
as a result of their dismissal, their non-reelection, downsizing of their
position or, at least, their future non-promotion.15 These harms are liable to
lead to capital loss, expressed in financial damage, as well as to considerable
emotional trauma.16 Consequently, the harm caused by discrediting is more
severe than that caused to private individuals.17
The above uncovers and clarifies the deterrent power already rooted in the
laws of tortious accountability. Public officials aspire to hold onto their
government positions, which imbue them with influence and power. They are
interested in promotion, which also comes with financial benefits. All of this
15

For a range of potential harms, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
518 (1970).
16
See Note, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809–18 (1979); Mark
G. Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 1322, 1390 (1976).
17
De Mot & Faure, too, note that while financial sanctions have weak deterrent power, as
in the case of potential tortfeasors in the public sector, the risk of reputational damage, as
a result of the very imposition of tort accountability, may be effective in guiding conduct.
See Jef De Mot & Michael Faure, Public Authority Liability and the Chilling Effect, 22
TORT L. REV. 120, 127 (2014).
OF EXPRESSION
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generates private guidance, motivating public officials to strive to avoid
being labeled negligent.18 A court declaration that a public official is
negligent damages the public’s trust in them as well as their ability to carry
out their duties. Such a declaration testifies to their conduct being
incompatible with public consciousness and values. The desire of public
officials to avoid these costs guides their conduct, incentivizing them to act
optimally to maximize the public interest.
Consequently, the arguments against applying tort law to public sector
tortfeasors—based on the distinction between the tortfeasor and between the
agency actually paying the costs—hold when the stage of the imposition of
liability is isolated and is the sole focus. However, at the stage of the
18

For similar arguments on the deterrence of potential public sector tortfeasors by the risk
of reputational damage as a result of the imposition of tortious accountability, see
CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 22 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2009);
Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 923 (2018); Robert
Dijkstra, Essays on Financial Supervisory Liability 1, 129 (Oct. 13, 2015) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Tilburg University) (on file with author). See also Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages? 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401,
401 (2001) (asserting that the tortfeasors’ overall liability equals the compensation amount
with the addition of nonlegal sanctions). In this immediate context, Shapira demonstrates
that the law and personal reputation are not independent, but rather complementary
systems. See Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes
Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1203–04 (2016).
Theoretically, Shapira’s position can be identified with a theoretical movement that adopts
reputation-based arguments in order to explain why—in spite of short-term personal biases
and interests (according to the theory of public choice)—government continues to function.
See David Zaring, Regulating by Repute, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1003–05 (2012). For example,
Guzman maintains that fear of a bad reputation is what makes states obey international
law, even when disobedience suits their political interests better. See ANDREW T.
GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71–72
(2008). In this context, Lax asserts that considerations of reputation explain part of the
strategic votes of U.S. Supreme Court justices on whether to grant a writ of certiorari. See
Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion,
Reputation, and the Rule of Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61 (2003). Rose found that the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission viewed considerations of reputation to be a key
factor influencing obeyance of its regulations. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173,
2222 (2010).
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investigation of accountability—even if it should be imposed on the
agency—is the action of the public official that will be under court
investigation, and the public will hear of the conduct. The stage of the
imposition of accountability—that of the court declaration that a public
official was negligent, and their labeling as such—is extremely personal, and
the political (compared with the financial) price that the public official will
be forced to pay as a result is also personal. In other words, the institutional
setting within which public officials function supplies a good security net at
the stage of the imposition of liability in that it is the former, not the latter,
that pays the injured party. However, it only extends partial protection prior
to this, at the stage of the imposition of accountability. This protection does
not prevent the official’s conduct from being publicly exposed. Nor is it
capable of nullifying the public criticism that will follow fast on the heels of
a negligent label. It is a financial, not a political, shield and, as noted, is
powerless to nullify the political price that the public official will have to
pay. Thus, although traditional tortious accountability is the institutional
responsibility of the agency, it is the employee’s action that will be the focus
of the legal proceeding investigating the issue of accountability. This suffices
to generate private guidance and to create effective incentives to act
optimally.
B. Level of the Agency as a Social Actor: Central Guidance
Why devote a separate subsection to the level of the public agency as a
social actor, isolating it from the discussion on the public official as a private
person? First, a separate establishment of the arguments relating to each
makes it possible to disconnect them. Thus, non-acceptance of my
conclusions with respect to the deterrence of public officials will not
influence the establishment of my argument with respect to the deterrence of
agencies. Moreover, this article strengthens the relationship between the two.
In this subsection, this article argues that the intentionality of the agency
leads directly to the correction of the acts of the public official and,
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consequently, the analysis of the agency as a social actor—and establishment
of my argument with respect to central guidance—has an independent,
important purpose. This article’s intention is to emphasize that the capacity
of tort law to yield central guidance, and thus guide the agency’s actions—
by means of its characteristics as a social actor—is of enormous significance
in situations where private guidance cannot be generated to effectively deter
the public official. The deterred agency, striving to act optimally (to
maximize the public interest), will not allow the public official to realize their
suboptimal aspirations (which are motivated by personal interest, according
to the theory of public choice).
In order to create effective private guidance, the public official must have
been elected to their position and be motivated by political incentives. In
addition, they must be center stage, under court investigation. For example,
there are two major situations where there is concern that effective private
guidance is unattainable. In the first, the public official is not an elected
official and is not motivated by political incentives (even if liable to be under
court investigation should they act sub-optimally). In the second situation,
the public official is not under court investigation (even if motivated by
political incentives). This article will expand a little on each situation.
In the first situation, the public official does not have great political
aspirations and, therefore, the risk of being under court investigation would
not deter them. They were not elected to their position and are not motivated
by political incentives—the voices of the voters. Indeed, most of the various
government systems are not comprised of elected officials but of bureaucrats
appointed by the government. It is difficult to predict the impact of tortious
labeling on the conduct of such clerks, bureaucrats, and those acting on behalf
of the State who are not elected officials, while it is the conduct of the elected
officials that such labeling purports to guide.
In the second situation, it is frequently the case that the public official is
not the only one liable under court investigation. A familiar phenomenon is
that the entity that produced the tortious conduct is an intricate, branched-out
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system that cannot be easily broken down or separated. A large part of
government activity is the product of such a complex system of numerous
public officials, none of whom would be liable to stand alone under court
investigation. Such a scenario is more common and conspicuous the larger
and more intricate the structure of the public agency in question.
In view of these situations where, presumably, effective private deterrence
would be unattainable, the need arises for central guidance, that is, the
deterrence of the agency as a social actor that, in turn, would forestall the
public official’s suboptimal aspirations. To understand how tort law is
capable of measuring up to the task of effectively deterring the agency, the
ensuing discussion will be based on two intertwined levels. In the first, this
article proposes viewing the public agency as a social actor aspiring for a
good reputation, political survival, and bureaucratic autonomy. In the second,
this article analyzes the importance of breaking down the effects of the
application of tort law into two—that of the imposition of accountability and
that of the imposition of liability. These two levels will be discussed
separately, ultimately combining into one overall argument, whose essence
is that public agencies, as social actors, attach great importance to not being
found or labeled negligent, and this Damoclean sword that hangs over them
serves to deter them and effectively guide their conduct. As a result, the
intentional aspiration of public agencies to act optimally can forestall the
intentional aspiration of public officials to act sub-optimally. This article will
broaden the scope of the discussion on this fundamental argument.
There is no disputing the fact that it is possible to guide the conduct of
profit-maximizing privately owned corporations by means of tort law
through the provisions for compensation. In this subsection, this article
maintains that tort law is also capable of guiding the conduct of “public
corporations”— through the rules of accountability. The perception of the
agency as a social actor is crucial with regard to the question of how decisionmaking processes are shaped by the agency.
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The perception of the agency as a social actor assumes that it is selfsufficient. This article refers to “self-sufficiency” as the characteristic that
enables the agency to function as an autonomous social actor. The agency is
invested with self-sufficiency and has the power to make its own decisions.19
It is able to determine the composition of its workforce, determine what
measures they adopt, and is authorized to act without the consent of its whole
workforce even when these actions do not fall in line with the personal
interest of the public official.20 As Coleman argues, an agency’s selfsufficiency is created by means of collective concessions by its members,
who sacrifice part of their rights in favor of the organizational actor. By
relinquishing their personal self-sufficiency for the sake of organizational
self-sufficiency, individuals force constraints on their own personal freedom,
empowering the organization to act as an autonomous social actor. 21
Therefore the agency’s self-sufficiency can be viewed in terms of power. The
agency is empowered to determine the characteristics of its employees and
has the ability to reward certain types of conduct and punish others. In
addition, it has the power to determine which positions will be filled by its
employees and how they perform them. The focus on positions—and not on
the persons staffing them—is an important element in the make-up of the
agency.22 In organizational environments, the personal preferences of
individuals are, or should be, put aside, and the collective considers what
“we” as a public agency must do.23 This characteristic of organizational self-

19
See JAMES S. COLEMAN, THE ASYMMETRIC SOCIETY 161–71 (1982) (discussing a
fundamental approach to decision-making).
20
See EDWARD O. LAUMANN & DAVID KNOKE, THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATE: SOCIAL
CHOICE IN NATIONAL POLICY DOMAINS (1987).
21
See Coleman, supra note 19, at 165–71.
22
Brayden G. King, Teppo Felin & David A. Whetten, Perspective—Finding the
Organization in Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as a Social
Actor, 21 ORG. SCI. 290, 293 (2010).
23
Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Collective Intentions and Team Agency, 104 J. PHIL.
109, 128–37 (2007).
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sufficiency enables the agency to coordinate the conduct of its workforce and
to produce the intended results.24
It follows that the agency’s self-sufficiency is reflected in its decisionmaking and in its ability to control the actions of its members (in both theory
and practice). This self-sufficiency results from its ability to guide its
members’ conduct and to cause them to act in certain ways, even if they
would not act like that under different circumstances. The tasks and goals of
the agency, the practices, and the authority it extends to its team generate
modes of conduct that can be ascribed to the agency and not to a single
member.25 Consequently, it can, and should, be viewed as accountable by law
for the outcome of this conduct. 26 Moreover, organizational research views
the self-sufficient agency as a social actor that is deterred by the very
possibility of the court declaring and labeling it negligent.
Organizational research proposes viewing self-sufficient organizations as
social actors, arguing that two important characteristics are attributable to
them:27 (1) external attribution, which seeks to explain the motivations of
organizations and the way they act on the basis of factors external to them;
and (2) intentionality, according to which organizations have their own
unique intentions and the ability to act in line with them. Therefore, the public
can perceive an organization as a type of social actor that is influenced by
factors external to it and is capable of processing these data and of acting in
24

See King et al., supra note 22, at 293–95.
The imposition of accountability on the agency testifies to the belief that it possesses
the ability to take the initiative, and consequently, is the one that could and should have
acted differently. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 147 (1983).
26
The theory of social actors refers to three kinds of actors in modern society: individuals,
organizations, and state. See King et al., supra note 22, at 297; John W. Meyer & Ronald
L. Jepperson, The “Actors” of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social
Agency, 18 SOCIO. THEORY 100–02 (2000). Therefore, the application of this theory—
originally only with respect to the state itself, as noted— is also imperative in the case of
public agencies.
27
King et al., supra note 21, at 290.
25
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a deliberate, intentional manner.28 As previously indicated, since public
agencies can be viewed as self-sufficient organizations, these characteristics
are attributable to them, too, and they can be acknowledged as “social
actors.”
Additionally, this article examines the significance of defining agencies as
social actors. For this inquiry, this article will focus on two important
characteristics of self-sufficient organizations—external attribution and
intentionality.
The characteristic of external attribution assumes the agency has
constant interaction with the external world and that it attributes great
importance to the question of how the world perceives it.29 Self-sufficient
social actors are capable of making independent decisions; therefore, society
views them as accountable for those decisions.30 According to the
characteristic of external attribution, actors must perceive other social actors
as acting autonomously and as being accountable for their decisions and
actions.31 Indeed, our language reflects a reality where agencies are perceived
by third parties as acting and being accountable for their actions. In everyday
language, we tend to say, “so-and-so signed an agreement with the manager,”
“such-and-such government office let dozens of employees go,” and “the
agency acted irresponsibly.” This linguistic reality corresponds with the
concept in organizational identity theory that organizations have a unique
“behavioral signature” and clear decision-making patterns.32 This is also
28
See Paul Ingram & Karen Clay, The Choice-Within-Constraints New Institutionalism
and Implications for Sociology, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 525 (2000),
http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/525.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCS5-B26T]; David A.
Whetten, Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of Organizational
Identity, 15 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 219 (2006).
29
King, Felin & Whetten, supra note 22, at 297.
30
Id. at 292.
31
Id.
32
Id. Although it can be argued that the more closely the agency is tied to a political
factor— due to hierarchical subordination, by being subject to policy or by appointment
procedures—the less autonomous it will be perceived to be, and vice versa. Its definition
as a “social actor” will be weakened or strengthened accordingly. Therefore, caution must
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Coleman’s logic, according to which organizations are social actors because
society bestows this status on them.33 The agency’s status derives largely
from the expectations of the public, which views it as accountable for its
actions.34 Concepts such as image and reputation, which in common usage
are in connection with public agencies, also attest to the fact that the public
perceives them as accountable for their actions—a situation that, according
to the organizational research literature, they are sensitive to. 35 Since
agencies are responsible for the realization of the goals for which they were
established, third parties hold them accountable when they fail in this
respect.36 A declaration that an agency failed or was negligent is no trivial
matter. Research conducted on the course of life of organizations determined
that agencies go through maturation stages similar to “natural persons,”37
while various theoretical models define organizations as unique actors that
experience birth and are particularly concerned that, should they fail to act
optimally, they are destined for extinction.38
The understanding that organizations acknowledge the environment’s
expectations of them and aspire to survive and maintain bureaucratic
autonomy has led organizational theory to determine that social actors are
capable of intentional conduct. This is the characteristic of intentionality,
be exercised, and the relationship between it and its superiors must be weighed when
applying to it the characteristics of a “social actor.”
33
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (2019). See also BARBARA
CZARNIAWSKA, NARRATING THE ORGANIZATION: DRAMAS OF INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY
(1997).
34
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & TIM MAY, THINKING SOCIOLOGICALLY (2d ed. 2001).
35
See CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE
IMAGE (1996); Charles J. Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? Reputation
Building and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 233, 234–35, (1990).
36
Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons
from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 233–34, (1987).
37
Andrew H. Van de Van & Marshal S. Poole, Explaining Change and Development in
Organizations, 20 ACAD. MGMT REV. 510 (1995).
38
MICHAEL T. HANNAH & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 36 (1989)
(ebook). See also the course of life of agencies in MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, 163–64 (1955).
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according to which agencies have some form of intention on which their
decision-making is based.39 Researchers postulate that organizations have
intentions that are independent of the beliefs, preferences, goals, and personal
values of the individuals constituting them40 and have a unique self-vision41
and self-discipline.42 It also follows that public agencies have unique
identities that define them and legitimize their existence. 43 The goals the
organization is responsible for achieving and the values it is designed to
instill are what consolidate its identity and delineate its intentions. 44 In this
context, organizational theories maintain that the actions of the organization
stem from their “self-vision,” that is, from that same perspective that directs
the actions and guides the conduct of its members. The organization’s selfvision is reflected in its tendency towards goal-directed action, its official
public goals serving as a conduct guide for its members.45 These goals
provide the members of the organization with criteria for judging the
appropriateness of the agency’s conduct and of their strategies. These goals
also provide them with a justification for their conduct and enable individuals
within the organization to evaluate its performance. Individuals outside the
organization can use this method to evaluate its performance as well. Failure
to realize these goals, and a declaration that the organization was negligent
in its mission to realize them, is liable to endanger its survival. Consequently,

39

King et al., supra note 22, at 292.
Id. at 294.
41
Whetten, supra note 28.
42
Peter J. Burke, The Self: Measurement Requirements from an Interactionist Perspective,
43 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 18 (1980).
43
See David A. Whetten & Alison Mackey, A Social Actor Conception of Organizational
Identity and its Implications for the Study of Organizational Reputation, 41 BUS. SOC. 393
(2002).
44
See also the fundamental argument in PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN
ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1957).
45
See, e.g., Charles Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organization, 26 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 854 (1961).
40
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the threat of a court declaration that the organization was negligent serves as
a highly powerful tool for guiding the conduct of its members.46
What are the implications of the perception of agencies as social actors
characterized by external attribution and intentionality? The answer to this
question is connected to the need to break down the tortious effect. 47 This
step is essential in order to correctly evaluate the deterrent power of tort law.
Most of the relevant professional literature to date has related and continues
to relate tort law as a homogenous whole and has devoted insufficient
attention to the importance of distinguishing between the stage of the
imposition of accountability and that of the imposition of liability. 48 This
article has presented the criticism voiced in the professional literature,
questioning the deterrent power of the provisions for compensation in tort
law. According to this criticism, the imposition of liability does not
effectively guide the conduct of potential public sector tortfeasors because
the latter have abundant financial resources, are not in any case paying out of
their own pockets the compensation adjudged, are incentivized by political
rather than by financial considerations, and so forth. However, the rules of
tort accountability—the stage prior to the application of the provisions for
compensation, where the defendant is found to be negligent and labeled
accordingly—is all-powerful in guiding conduct when it is a matter of
potential tortfeasors in the public sector. Tort law is not only “compensation
law”—it is also “labeling law”.
This is the point where the first level (the public agency, as a social actor,
characterized by aspirations for a good reputation, political survival, and
bureaucratic autonomy, and capable of goal-directed action) and the second
46

See, e.g., John Freeman, Glenn R. Carroll & Michael T. Hannan, The Liability of
Newness: Age Dependence in Organizational Death Rates, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 692
(1983).
47
See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859 (2001).
48
See Levinson, supra note 9 (focusing on the problematic nature of the compensation
tool in deterring the state, not on the labeling tool, which are the rules of accountability).
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level (the tortious effect broken down into two components, the imposition
of accountability and the imposition of liability) are intertwined, forming one
basic argument whose essence is as follows: Public agencies, as social actors,
attribute great importance to not being found negligent or labeled as such,
and it is this Damoclean sword that deters them, guides their conduct
effectively, and may remedy the failures of the public official. In instances
where the public official is indeed likely to aspire to act sub-optimally, the
deterred agency will not allow it, and they will be incapable of realizing their
aspirations. In fact, scholars have found that public agencies aspire to
maximize their status and increase their power, 49 government decisions are
influenced by motives of department enhancement,50 and agencies attach the
utmost importance to their public image.51 Consequently, the agency’s
reputation plays a decisive role in its conduct. Public and political criticism
is likely to follow in the wake of a court ruling that an agency was negligent.
This damage, in turn, is liable to lead to a diminishment of its powers, to a
cut in its resources and, in extreme cases—to its elimination. These
explanations are likely to make a crucial contribution to appreciating the fact
that the avoidance of being labeled negligent by a tort court is of the utmost
importance to agencies due to their aspirations to maintain their status,
continue to survive politically, and gain a positive reputation. This deterrence
of public agencies by means of tort law makes it very difficult for public

49
See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); see also William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617
(1975); Jean-Luc Migue & Gerard Belanger, Toward a General Theory of Managerial
Discretion, 17 PUB. CHOICE 27, 28 (1974).
50
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
51
See also the findings in Daniel P. Carpenter, State Building Through Reputation
Building: Coalitions of Esteem and Program Innovation in National Postal System, 1883–
1913, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 121 (2001); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001).
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officials within a public agency to act sub-optimally and can be expected to
remedy their failures.
There are clear advantages to the agency’s liability as a social actor,
particularly with respect how its properties influence various processes, and
more importantly, its decision-making. Organizational decision-making is a
process that is shaped by the source from which the organization’s selfsufficiency derives and to which it is accountable.52 In the case of public
agencies, it is the general public. They are accountable to it and meant to
serve it. Moreover, the goals set are an important mechanism according to
the decisions made.53 The perception of the agency as a social actor is crucial,
since it contributes to our understanding of public actors’ decision-making
process.54 A court declaration that an agency was negligent spotlights its
failure to realize its goals. It can be presumed that this is invaluable in guiding
conduct, influencing the decision-making process. The perception of the
public agency as a social actor, and the latter’s understanding, stress the fact
that it is aware of the purpose for which it was created and aspires not to be
defeated in the legal, public, and mass media spheres. This fact underlies its
decision-making processes and guides its conduct. Indeed, public agencies
are capable of acting purposefully and intentionally, independent of the
beliefs, preferences, and personal goals of the individuals constituting them.
C. Summary
In tort law, it is customary to identify the term “deterrence” with a sanction
imposed on tortfeasors that reduces or prevents the damage risks created or
liable to be created by them. Although criticisms relating to issues with the
imposition of damages serving as a conduct guide in the public sector are
valid, the utilization of tort law to that end is justifiable on the grounds of

52

King et al., supra note 22, at 300.
Id.
54
See, e.g., Chip Heath & Sim B. Sitkin, Big-B Versus Big-O: What Is Organizational
About Organizational Behavior? 22 J. ORG. BEHAV. 43 (2001).
53
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deterrence. This is justifiable due to the component of accountability, which
is a component of tort law, in addition to damages. Thus, the threat of the
imposition of tort accountability serves to correct the potential sub-optimal
acts of public officials, since they are deterred by the very possibility of being
center stage under court investigation, even should damages not be imposed
on them, due to the importance they attribute to their public status.
Moreover, even when the public officials cannot be deterred because they
do not attribute much importance to their public status or are not liable to be
alone and center stage, the agency itself is likely to be deterred by the threat
of the imposition of accountability. Consequently, the agency can be
expected to take measures to prevent the public officials from acting suboptimally. Since agencies attribute the utmost importance to their public
image, and given their continuous aspiration to survive and maintain their
bureaucratic autonomy, it can be assumed that their response to the risks of
being held accountable would generate an internal system for drawing
conclusions and adopting decision-making procedures more sensitive to the
extent of the potential for harm generated by the activity of its functionaries.
Agencies facing the risk of being held accountable can be expected to
implement risk management procedures, to adopt supervisory measures, to
identify possible exposure to accidents, and to take action to minimize the
probability of their existence. Such responses are likely to include, for
example, best-practice programs for the selection and training of employees
and the implementation of procedures that link their salary and promotion
options to the costs created by them. Thus, it emerges from the findings of
organizational theory that public agencies, which can be ascribed the
characteristics of social actors and accordingly attribute the utmost
importance to their public image (external attribution) and are capable of selfguidance (intentionality)— will be deterred by the risk of being held
accountable and will adopt measures to correct the failures of the public
official.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article analyzed tort law’s ability to effectively guide the actions of
public officials and agencies. The proposal of separating tort judgments into
two components, the imposition of accountability and the imposition of
liability, leads to the conclusion that the threat of the imposition of
accountability and of the public official being accordingly labeled negligent
suffices to effectively guide their conduct. An important perspective is
thereby added to the discourse on the deterrent power of tort law. Until now,
this discourse was dominated mainly by the paradigm of the economic
analysis of the litigation process and focused on the component of financial
sanctions, which ignored, to some extent, the imposition of accountability.
This discussion began by arguing that the proposal to utilize tort law to
guide government conduct is attractive when suboptimal conduct is
uncovered. This article explained that, according to the theory of public
choice, public officials do not always act optimally. This conclusion led to
recognition of the need to guide their conduct. Next, this article analyzed the
major issues of a theory that views tort law as an effective deterrence tool in
such an environment. This relates to the fact that tortfeasors in the public
sector do not personally incur the payment of damages imposed on them and
respond less to market incentives than to political incentives. Therefore,
according to this argument, tort law is unsuitable in a field in which actors
are employees in the public sector, and it will have a hard time deterring them
and effectively guiding their conduct.
Although this article accepted the criticism of deterrence theory and
adopted the assumption that potential tortfeasors in the public sector are not
likely to respond in the same manner to the risk of the imposition of damages
as those in the private sector, this article demonstrated that, as a deterrent,
tort law can still be used for the purpose of guiding their actions. This is due
to the heavy price that the imposition of accountability by a court of law is
likely to exact from the public official and agency as social actors. Phrased
differently, when deterrent power is ascribed to tort law merely with respect
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to the imposition of liability, it may indeed have a hard time guiding the
conduct of employees in the public sector. However, when the deterrent
power of tort law is examined from the aspect the imposition of
accountability, different conclusions are likely to be reached.
At this point, this article has demonstrated that the declaration and labeling
of an agency and its employees as negligent is indeed capable of exacting a
heavy price from them in the public sphere. This is declaratory guidance,
which minimizes harms without detracting from the benefit it holds, even
should the liability of the public-sector tortfeasor be merely partial. Tort law
enables parties injured by government activity to signal the harm caused to
them and to bring it to the attention of public-sector tortfeasors. Thus, the
latter are not indifferent to these signals. In this context, the capacity of tort
law to guide the actions of agencies by way of their characteristics as social
actors is of the utmost importance even when the public official cannot be
effectively deterred. This is primarily because agencies desire to avoid
negative labeling. As a result, their ability to intentionally act optimally
remedies the failures of the public official.
My conclusion, stated above, derives from recognition that public officials
attribute the utmost importance to their public reputation and, as a result, can
be expected to be deterred by being center stage, under court investigation
(even if not personally incurring the actual payment of the financial
compensation). My conclusion also derives from recognition that public
agencies function as social actors and that the characteristics of “external
attribution” and “intentionality” can be ascribed to them. These two
characteristics render them susceptible to the external approval of the public,
leading them to direct their conduct accordingly. Thus, public agencies are
deterred by the risk of being labeled negligent at the stage of the imposition
of accountability and their desire to avoid this guides their conduct,
motivating them to internalize the public costs of potentially negligent
conduct. Moreover, the desire of agencies to avoid negative labeling and their
ability to intentionally act optimally remedy the failures of the public official
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aspiring to act sub-optimally. The imposition of tort accountability in the
world of government “accidents” is an important tool when the goal is to
guide government conduct and generate effective deterrence.
Therefore, the Damoclean sword of tort accountability must be
distinguished from liability because it keeps agencies and their employees on
their toes, incentivizing them to act optimally. Public agencies and their
employees are entrusted with enormous power, and this must be constrained
and monitored in order to protect the individuals exposed to it. Tort law
serves the interests of the public and of the public agency alike. It makes a
vital contribution to the deterrence of public officials and agencies, even if
this goal is not easily achievable and even if it does not do so perfectly.
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